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Clerk
District Court

DEC - 9 2003

For The Northern Marian	a Islands
(Deputy Clerk)	-X

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	Criminal No. 02-0013
Plaintiff	) )
	) DECISION RE:
v. )	DENIAL OF 28 U.S.C. § 2255
	MOTION TO VACATE, SET
MUN, Deuk Kyu,	ASIDE, OR CORRECT
	) SENTENCE
Defendant	

BY ORDER dated December 8, 2003, the court denied defendant Mun's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence and indicated that this written decision would be forthcoming. Plaintiff has appeared by and through its attorney, Assistant U.S. Attorney Gregory Baka; defendant has appeared through counsel F. Matthew Smith.

Defendant Mun Deuk Kyu alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. In his motion, he sought an order (1) directing that he be immediately brought before the court to hear and determine the legality of his restraint, (2) discharging him from further custody, (3) allowing him to post bail pending the hearing on this motion, (4) an order appointing his current counsel to continue representing him, (5) and an evidentiary hearing. For the following reasons, defendant's motion was denied.

Defendant made five claims in support of his motion that he was denied ineffective assistance of counsel. The court will discuss each in turn.

First, defendant claimed that his original trial counsel failed to move for dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the unavailability of alien witnesses deprived him of his right to compulsory process. It is sufficient to dispose of this claim to note that defendant failed to make a "plausible showing that the testimony of the witnesses would have been material and favorable to his defense[.]" <u>United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal</u>, 458 U.S. 858, 872-873, 102 S.Ct. 3440 (1982). As important, defendant failed to make the required showing of bad faith by plaintiff in regards to this claim. *See* <u>United States v. Dring</u>, 930 F.2d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 1991).

Second, defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to "properly discover, investigate, compel, or call as defense witnesses those alleged aliens who [defendant] allegedly brought or attempted to bring to the United States as their testimony might have shown that they were tourists, were not going to Guam, were not aliens and/or other material matters favorable to [the] defense; and improperly stipulated that the fourteen were aliens of the United States." During the trial one of the aliens did testify and was cross-examined by defendant's trial counsel. Testimony of more witnesses would have been cumulative. As to the stipulation of the alienage of the fourteen persons who had been smuggled into the Commonwealth, the court cannot speculate as to the reasons for it. However, as plaintiff pointed out in its opposition memorandum, it is entirely possible that trial counsel concluded that it would have been easy for plaintiff to prove that the aliens were not legally in the Commonwealth and that to allow drawn out evidence of that fact would have only been more damning to his client's chances. Defendant's argument about what "might have been shown" was insufficient to assist him in this motion, particularly in light of the well-developed record.

 Defendant next claimed that his trial counsel failed to object to the hearsay testimony of Zheng, an alleged co-conspirator, and that the testimony unfairly prejudiced him by linking him with a conspiracy "at which he was merely present." Such testimony is non-hearsay under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E): a statement by a co-conspirator during the course and furtherance of a conspiracy is not hearsay.

Fourth, defendant argued that his trial counsel should have withdrawn when defendant objected to his continued representation, and that the court should have allowed him to represent himself.<sup>1</sup> The latter argument was rejected by the Ninth Circuit and need not be re-visited here. See United States v. Mun Deuk Kyu, No. 02-10667 (Oct. 17, 2003). As to the former, the record in this matter discloses that defendant sought to dismiss his trial counsel when all that remained for him to do was give his closing argument. The motion was at that point untimely. See e.g. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 262-263 (9th Cir. 1997) (establishing a "bright line" rule that a request to represent oneself is

Defendant, by not appealing the denial of his oral motion for substitute appointed counsel at the time he sought to dismiss his trial counsel, has waived the issue. <u>United States v. Martini</u>, 31 F.3d 781, 782 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994), *quoting* <u>In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co.</u>, 945 F.2d 320, 325 (9th Cir. 1991).

timely if made before the jury is empaneled); <u>United States v. Bishop</u>, 291 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th Cir. 2002); <u>United States v. McKenna</u>, 327 F.3d 830, 844 (9th Cir. 2003).

Last, defendant argued that his trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient for failure to bring a Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence to sustain the claim.

Defendant has not supported this argument with anything to show how this alleged failure harmed him. The court presided at this jury trial and is familiar with the evidence presented. The court then and now concluded, as did the jury, that the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming.

Defendant failed to make the requisite showings of deficient performance by his counsel and that such deficient performance was so serious as to deprive him of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). For that reason, his requests for an order (1) directing that he be immediately brought before the court to hear and determine the legality of his restraint, (2) discharging him from further custody, (3) allowing him to post bail pending the hearing on this motion, and (4) and a pre-trial hearing to establish the process for scheduling an evidentiary hearing were denied. However, upon

further consideration, the court grants defendant's motion for an order appointing attorney Matthew Smith as his counsel, *nunc pro tunc* to October 15, 2003.

IT WAS AND IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 9th day of December, 2003.

ALEX R. MUNSON

Judge