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Clark

District Court

OCT 2 / 2002

For The Northern Mariana Islands
By (Deputy Clerk)

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JUYEL AHMED, et al.,

Plaintiffs

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
COMMONWEALTH OF THE)
NORTHERN MARIANA)
ISLANDS,)

Defendants

RUI LIANG, et al.,

Plaintiffs

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS,

Defendants

Civil Action No. 00-0005

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

ORDER REGARDING
MOTIONS TO DISMISS
FILED BY DEFENDANTS
COMMONWEALTH OF THE
NORTHERN MARIANA
ISLANDS and UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

Civil Action No. 99-0046

 THESE MATTERS came before the court on August 8, 2002, for hearing of defendant Commonwealth's motion to strike or dismiss the fifth amended complaint and on September 26, 2002, for hearing of defendant United States' motion to strike or dismiss the fifth amended complaint. Plaintiffs appeared by and through their attorney, Bruce L. Jorgensen; defendant Commonwealth appeared by and through Assistant Attorneys General Andrew Clayton and Karen M. Klaver; and, defendant United States appeared by and through Cindy S. Ferrier of the United States Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation - Civil Division, and Assistant United States Attorney Gregory Baka.

THE COURT, having considered the written arguments of defendants¹ and the oral arguments of plaintiffs and defendants, rules as follows:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted will succeed only if from the complaint it appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs can

The court denied plaintiffs' motion to extend the time in which to file their opposition to defendant Commonwealth's motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs filed no opposition to defendant United States' motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the court allowed plaintiffs' attorney to be heard at oral argument.

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prove no set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle them to relief. Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002). In reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint, the "issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686 (1974). Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 692 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the court also has discretion to refuse to allow another attempt to properly plead claims for relief where it concludes there has been undue delay, bad faith or a dilatory motive, that to allow amendment would be futile, that there would be prejudice to the opposing party, or if there has been repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments. Schwarzer, Tashima, and Wagstaffe Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 8:416 (2001), see also e.g. Steckman v. Hart Brewing, 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998); Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996).

Summary of Rulings on the Fourth Amended Complaint

By orders dated April 11 and April 19, 2002, the court granted in part and denied in part defendant Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the fourth amended complaint.²

The substantive claims for relief in the fourth amended complaint can be characterized as follows. Count 1³ alleged a common law claim for unlawful imprisonment, in violation of the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") and unspecified sections of the *Restatement (Third)* of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Count 2 alleged a policy and practice by defendants Zachares, Goldberg, and the Commonwealth of violating the ATCA and unspecified sections of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Count 3 alleged violations of plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process rights and sought injunctive relief. Count 4 alleged a conspiracy by defendant Zachares and others. Count 5 alleged violations of the

Defendant United States chose to answer the fourth amended complaint.

In the interests of uniformity and clarity, the court adopts the format, e.g. "count 1," used by plaintiffs to designate their claims in the fourth amended complaint, and that used by them in the fifth amended complaint, e.g. "first claim for relief."

misrepresentation, concealment, and nondisclosure sections of *Restatement* (Second) of Torts, said sections applicable to the Commonwealth through 7 N.Mar.I. Code § 3401. The sixth count alleged estoppel based on the foregoing alleged acts of misrepresentation. The final count, count 7, alleged a violation of Article X, § 9 of the Commonwealth Constitution, which allows taxpayer lawsuits.

The court denied the motion to dismiss as to counts 1, 2, and 6, except as to defendants Goldberg and Zachares, who were dismissed with prejudice in the orders of April 11 and 19, 2002, respectively. The court ruled that those three counts otherwise survived. The motion to dismiss count 3, which alleged violations of plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process rights, was also denied. Count 4, a conspiracy claim against defendant Zachares and others unnamed, was dismissed with prejudice as to Zachares in the court's order of April 11, 2002. Count 5 was dismissed with prejudice, except as to the claim based on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 557A. Count 7, alleging violations of Article X, § 9 of the Commonwealth Constitution, was dismissed with prejudice.

Claims in the Fifth Amended Complaint

The principal issue that the court will ultimately be asked to decide is not one of plaintiffs' right to asylum or entry into the United States.⁴ Rather, it is simply if they are entitled to submit for consideration their applications for asylum, which applications will be based on their allegations of torture and persecution.⁵

As the court stated at oral argument of the United States' motion:

THE COURT: See, we're not talking about granting asylum. We're talking about review of an application. So that doesn't "open the floodgates" to the United States. * * * Just because somebody makes an application doesn't mean that they have entry.

MS. FERRIER: That is correct. However, you know, we would also point out that there is no right for, for these persons to even be able to apply for asylum or for discretionary relief within the United States.

<u>Unofficial Transcript of Hearing on United States' Motion to Dismiss, Ahmed, et al.</u> v. United States, et al., Civil Action No. 00-0005 (Sept. 26, 2002).

For example, plaintiff Ahmed, a citizen of Bangladesh, claims that minions of the Bangladesh government beat him with wood and metal batons (which beating resulted in a broken left hip), sliced the soles of his feet with a straight razor, and forced boiling water into his nose and mouth. Plaintiff Hossain alleges that he and his family have been threatened with reprisals as a result of his testimony in a criminal case in his homeland, Bangladesh. Plaintiff

The court characterizes the claims for relief in the fifth amended complaint as follows:

The first claim is for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs allege that defendants United States and the Commonwealth have a duty to determine their refugee status under § 207 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1157.

In their second claim for relief, plaintiffs claim a right to be free from torture and cruel and inhuman treatment. The claim is made against both the United States and the Commonwealth and rests on the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act ("FARRA") and numerous statutory remedies.

Plaintiffs' third claim for relief is based on the Alien Tort Claims Act and Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702,

International Law of Human Rights: Customary Law of International Human

Rights. See Fifth Amended Complaint, ¶ 142. The claim seeks relief only

Roe, a citizen of the People's Republic of China, claims that she and her family in China have been threatened with physical violence as a result of her complaints about her garment factory employer. Other plaintiffs are Sri Lankans, who allege the threat of persecution if they are returned, and Chinese citizens who claim religious persecution and the possibility of state-decreed infanticide should female plaintiffs give birth to more than one child.

against defendant Commonwealth.

The fourth claim for relief alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy to deny plaintiffs their civil and constitutional rights. Only the Commonwealth, acting through its officials, is named specifically.

The fifth and final claim for relief is a claim against both the United States and the Commonwealth for misrepresentation, concealment, and/or nondisclosure. It is predicated on *Restatement (Second) of Torts* § 557A, <u>Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Miscellaneous Transactions</u>.

The Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss

In the April 19th order, the court ruled⁶ that count 2, unlawful policy or practice as to Ahmed, Liang, and Nian, count 3, violation of due process, and count 5 survived the motion to dismiss, in whole or in part.

In its order of April 19, 2002, granting in part and denying in part defendant Commonwealth's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' fourth amended complaint, the court ruled that counts 1, 2, and 6 survived the motion to dismiss, but only as to defendant Commonwealth. However, in their fifth amended complaint, plaintiffs abandoned their count 1 unlawful imprisonment claim; it does not appear. Similarly, count 6, estoppel, was not re-pleaded in the fifth amended complaint although the court ruled it had survived the motion to dismiss. Counts 1 and 6 of the fourth amended complaint, having been abandoned, may not now be re-pleaded.

The court will consider defendant Commonwealth's motion to dismiss all five counts in the fifth amended complaint with the above rulings in mind.

Defendant Commonwealth first moves to dismiss the first through fourth claims for relief for two interrelated reasons. First, because the four claims violate the court's two orders on the motion to dismiss the fourth amended complaint because they add new claims and parties and, second, because no motion to amend or add parties was made prior to their inclusion in the new complaint.

The April 19, 2002, order stated that plaintiffs' counsel "should insure that only the remaining claims for relief and defendants are included" in the fifth amended complaint. Order Granting in Part and Denying is Part Defendant Common-wealth's Motion to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint, at p. 5.

This order was intended, as were the court's previous orders on motions to dismiss the various complaints, to narrow and clarify the issues and the parties against whom relief was being sought. Defendant Commonwealth argues that plaintiffs violated the order by including new causes of action and new defendants and that dismissal of the first, second, and fourth claims for relief is justified on this ground.

The Commonwealth also argues that, in addition, dismissal of the first, second, and fourth claims for relief is warranted by plaintiffs' failure to seek leave to amend to add new claims and new parties defendant. *See* Fed.R.Civ.P. 15.

Claims one and two of the fifth amended complaint are merely count 3 from the fourth amended complaint, now separated for clarity. The court has reviewed the first two claims and finds that they are sufficient to put defendant Commonwealth on notice as to the nature of the claims against it and the relief sought. In part because of the unique relationship between defendants United States and Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the court cannot say that "it appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle them to relief." Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d at 759. However, the Commonwealth's argument is well-taken as to any claims alleged against now former Commonwealth Attorney General Robert T. Torres and Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Labor and Immigration Joaquin A. Tenorio. Allegations against them are dismissed with prejudice for failure to abide by the court's order of April 19, 2002, and to seek

 leave to add new parties defendant.⁷ Accordingly, defendant Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the first and second claims for relief in the fifth amended complaint is denied, except as ordered above.

The third claim for relief, based on the ATCA and Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702, survives, but only as to plaintiffs Ahmed, Liang, and Nian. No motion to amend was made to add the other plaintiffs to the third claim for relief. In any event, the fifth amended complaint does not allege any tortious conduct by defendant Commonwealth toward other named plaintiffs.

The fourth claim for relief alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy to deny plaintiffs their civil and constitutional rights. Only the Commonwealth, acting through its officials, is named specifically. As to any claims alleged against now former Commonwealth Attorney General Robert T. Torres and Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Labor and Immigration Tenorio, those claims are dismissed with prejudice for violation of the court's April 19, 2002, order and for failure to seek leave to add parties. However, the

Plaintiffs' assertion that Torres, Tenorio, Powell, and Ashcroft are formerly unknown "Doe" defendants whom they have now been able to identify is unpersuasive. See Fifth Amended Complaint, p. 5, n.1.

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25 26 conspiracy claim itself remains, since it flows from and is consistent with the allegations of claims one and two.

Count 5 from the fourth amended complaint---misrepresentation, concealment, and nondisclosure under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 557A---reappears in the fifth amended complaint as the fifth claim for relief. The Commonwealth moves to dismiss the fifth claim for relief on the ground of sovereign immunity. It argues that 7 N.Mar.I. Code § 2204 insulates the Commonwealth from common law tort claims based on any form of misrepresentation; thus, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 557A, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Miscellaneous Transactions, necessarily encompasses a claim based on "nondisclosure" because that is merely a form of misrepresentation The court is not prepared, on the record8 as it now stands, to rule that "it appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle them to relief." Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d at 759. The Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the fifth claim for relief in

The court's order of October 26, 2001, held that the Commonwealth has sovereign immunity for "any intentional and/or negligent misrepresentations made to" plaintiffs, but the court has not yet fully addressed the question of nondisclosure under *Restatement* § 557A.

the fifth amended complaint is denied.

In summary, as to defendant Commonwealth, all claims for relief survive (claim three survives only as to Ahmed, Liang, and Nian), with the exceptions noted above. Given the several opportunities plaintiffs have had to amend their complaint, and their repeated failures to comply with the court's orders when amending, the court will not entertain another motion to again file an amended complaint to add new claims and/or parties. The court has discretion to *not* allow another attempt to properly plead claims for relief where there has been repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments. Schwarzer, Tashima, and Wagstaffe Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 8:416 (2001), see also e.g. Steckman v. Hart Brewing, 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998); Sisseton—Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996).

The United States' Motion to Dismiss

As an initial matter, all purported claims against Secretary of State Colin Powell and Attorney General John Ashcroft are dismissed with prejudice as untimely and in violation of the Federal Rules of Procedure and the court's previous orders. *See supra*.

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Any purported claim against federal defendants based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is dismissed with prejudice. The United States cannot be a defendant under that statute. *See* Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 700 n.27, 99 S.Ct. 1946 (1979).

In their first and second claims for relief, plaintiffs allege that both defendant United States and defendant Commonwealth have certain obligations, based on United States law and/or international law and agreements to which the United States, as a signatory, and, consequently, the Commonwealth, as a U.S. Territory, are bound and that they are entitled to a determination of their status as refugees.

Defendant United States utterly disavows any control over immigration into the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. See e.g.

"Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Federal Defendants'

Motion to Strike the Fifth Amended Complaint," at 16, 29, respectively (July 9, 2002) ("Aside from the limited exceptions set forth above, the CNMI exercises plenary authority over its own immigration pursuant to CNMI domestic law."

"Moreover, because the CNMI exercises authority over its immigration pursuant to CNMI domestic law, the Executive Branch of the federal

government is prohibited from regulating in this area.")

However, at the same time, defendant United States maintains that the federal government, acting through the INS, has "discretion" to operate within the Commonwealth on matters dealing with illegal immigrants:

Well, there seems to be a little bit of inconsistency. The INS comes into this courtroom and petitions this court to naturalize citizens. And the INS...has sent people from Washington to interview plaintiffs in this case. And the INS set up and paid for a tent city on Tinian for aliens, and then accepted their applications for asylum and then chartered a Hawaiian Airlines jet liner for \$600,000 and transported them to Chicago. And so, if the INS has no authority here and the CNMI has plenary authority, what are they doing all these things for?

Well, with regard to the naturalization authority, I believe that the Covenant provides actually that those particular provisions of the INA do apply within the CNMI. With regard to the INS sending representatives here to interview potential asylum applicants, that is something that they, that the INS--I mean, we're not denying certainly that the U.S. is sovereign over the CNMI. However, they are not asserting their authority; instead, they are coming in and they are interviewing where it appears, if it appears, and within their discretion, that persons may be eligible for asylum or there may be some sort of, I guess, remedy that needs to be effected for a particular alien. But, it's not required and indeed it's not authorized by the, by the INA. As we said, it's not something that the...the INA does not allow for persons to apply for asylum within the CNMI. That is, indeed, the CNMI's responsibility.

MS. FERRIER:

THE COURT:

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THE COURT: Well, so you're saying that it's totally discretionary with the INA to interview, accept applications, and grant asylum?

MS. FERRIER: Well, again, the...I'm not saying that the INS could accept and grant asylum applications for persons that are located, aliens that are located within the CNMI. They would need to be, first, taken to Guam or to the United States proper...

* * *

THE COURT: But that's within their discretion?

MS. FERRIER: Yes. It's a discretionary form of relief, though. It is

something that's within their discretion. I'm not...but, again,

I'm not saying that they have the statute, the way the

Covenant is set out and the way that the INA is set out, we

don't have authority here to act and grant asylum.

<u>Unofficial Transcript of Hearing on United States' Motion to Dismiss, Ahmed, et al.</u> v. United States, et al., Civil Action No. 00-0005 (Sept. 26, 2002).

And defendant United States, in its own memorandum of law in support of its motion to dismiss, recognizes that Congress has placed upon the federal government an obligation to insure that all of the United States' international obligations are observed. The United States quotes legislative history from the Senate concerning implementation of the Convention Against Torture:

That the United States shall implement the convention to the extent that the Federal Government exercises its legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein; to the extent that constituent units exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall take appropriate measures, to the end that competent

authorities of the constituent units may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of this Convention.

126 Cong. Rec. S17486-01, S17492 (Oct. 27, 1990) (Quoted in Defendant United States' Memorandum of Points and Authorities. Emphasis added).

The court is not ready to finally rule on this question in this motion to dismiss. The foregoing language, coupled with the United States' recognition and assertion that it is sovereign over the Commonwealth by the plain language of Covenant § 102, seems to indicate to the court that the United States is required to play a role in assuring that the Commonwealth, a "constituent unit exercis[ing] jurisdiction over such matters," fulfills all of the United States' international obligations. Because plaintiffs simply seek to submit and have

The court will also consider at a later time defendant United States' suggestion, apparently serious, that plaintiffs now present on American soil should seek a referral from the United Nations High Commission on Refugees.

Although it is defendants' understanding that the UNHCR takes the position that it will not interview persons seeking refugee status in the CNMI, plaintiffs may seek a referral from the UNHCR wherever the UNHCR is able and willing to interview them.

[&]quot;Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Federal Defendants' Motion to Strike the Fifth Amended Complaint," at 36-37 n.15 (July 9, 2002). See also <u>Unofficial Transcript of Hearing on United States' Motion to Dismiss</u>, <u>Ahmed</u>, et al. v. <u>United States</u>, et al., Civil Action No. 00-0005 (Sept. 26, 2002):

THE COURT: So that it's perfectly clear: Is it the position of the

considered their applications for admission into the United States, and because defendant United States recognizes at least some obligations in that regard, the court will not say that "from the complaint it appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle them to relief." Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d at 759. Accordingly, defendant United States' motion to dismiss claims for relief one and two is denied.

The third claim for relief is based on unlawful detention. The complaint is unclear as to whether or not plaintiffs seek relief from federal defendants in the third claim for relief but, on balance, it appears they do not. To the extent they

Department of Justice that these plaintiffs should seek the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees assistance to get the remedy they want?

* * *

MS. FERRIER: That is an alternative that the plaintiffs may seek.

* * *

THE COURT: So am I correct that it is the Department of Justice's position that these plaintiffs should seek the recommendation of the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as a

possible resolution of their problem?

MS. FERRIER: As a possible resolution, yes.

do seek such relief, the claim fails. Federal defendants have no authority to arrest or confine plaintiffs for alleged violations of the Commonwealth's immigration laws but, even if they did, no such claim has been even remotely alleged. The third claim for relief is dismissed with prejudice as to all federal defendants.

The fourth claim for relief, based on 42 U.S.C. § 1985, does not appear to be pleaded against defendant United States. To the extend that plaintiffs sought to allege a violation against the United States the claim fails because the United States has not consented to be sued under the statute. Claims against federal officials in their official or personal capacities have been dismissed, *supra*. Accordingly, the fourth claim for relief is dismissed with prejudice as to defendant United States and any individually-identified federal defendants, on the grounds set out above.

The fifth claim for relief---misrepresentation, concealment, and nondisclosure under *Restatement (Second) of Torts* § 557A---is dismissed with prejudice as to defendant United States on grounds of sovereign immunity. The Alien Tort Claims statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, does not waive the United States' sovereign immunity. *See e.g.* Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1332 n.4

(9th Cir. 1992), citing Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C.Cir. 1980). To the extent that a claim is asserted against federal officials acting in their official or personal capacities, the claim is dismissed with prejudice for the reasons set out above.

In sum, as to defendant United States, claims for relief one and two survive the motion to dismiss. Claims for relief three, four, and five are dismissed with prejudice. Also, as cited above, given the several opportunities plaintiffs have had to amend their complaint, and their repeated failures to comply with the court's orders when amending, the court will not entertain another motion to again file an amended complaint to add new claims and/or parties. The court has discretion to *not* allow another attempt to properly plead claims for relief where there has been repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments. Schwarzer, Tashima, and Wagstaffe Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 8:416 (2001), see also e.g. Steckman v. Hart Brewing, 143 F.3d at 1298; Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d at 355.

Defendant United States and defendant Commonwealth's motions to dismiss are granted and denied as set forth above. Defendants are given until 3:30 p.m., Tuesday, November 12, 2002, to file their answers.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 22nd day of October, 2002.

ALEX R. MUNSON
Judge